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Abstract
We present a new quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol based on coun-
terfactual quantum cryptography. We analyze the security of this protocol,
find that it can resist the attack presented by QBC’s no-go theorem. Our
protocol is simple, and probably gives a new way of constructing QBC pro-
tocol.
Keywords: quantum bit commitment, no-go theorem, counterfactual
quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution
1. Introduction
The bit commitment (BC) scheme is a basic primitive of modern cryp-
tography. The concept of bit commitment was first proposed by Blum in
[1]. It plays a crucial role in constructions of multi-party protocols, such as
zero-knowledge proof scheme, verified secret shared scheme, and so on.
BC scheme includes two phases, i.e. the commit phase and the opening
phase. In the commit phase, Alice chooses a commit bit b and sends a
piece of evidence to Bob. In the opening phase, Alice unveils the value of
b and Bob checks it. A commit bit commitment scheme has the following
properties. (i) Correctness. If Alice and Bob execute the scheme honestly,
Bob obtains the correct commit bit b in the opening phase. (ii) Concealing.
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Bob cannot know the commit bit b before the opening phase. (iii) Binding.
Alice cannot change the commit bit after the commit phase. A BC scheme is
unconditionally secure if there is no computational assumption on attacker’s
ability and it satisfies the properties of concealing and binding.
The first quantum bit commitment (QBC) scheme was proposed in 1984[2]
and it pointed that the binding security of the scheme can be attack by send-
ing entangled states. In 1993, a well-known QBC scheme was presented [3],
which is usually referred to as BCJL scheme and was once believed as a prov-
ably secure scheme. Unfortunately, Mayers found that the BCJL scheme was
insecure [4]. Later, Mayers, Lo and Chau separately present no-go theorem
and prove that the unconditional secure QBC protocol is impossible [5, 6, 7].
Although the correctness of no-go theorem is undoubtedly, the framework
of the theorem may not cover all the types of QBC protocols. People try to
construct QBC protocols to resist the attack presented by no-go theorem
under some security conditions. Using the different agents, the relativistic
QBC protocols are proposed by Kent [8, 9, 10]. The protocol [10] has been
implemented by different groups [11, 12]. There are several QBC protocols
proposed based on physical hypothesis, such as bounded-quantum-storage
model [13, 14], noisy-storage model [15, 16, 17] and technological limitations
on non-demolition measurements [18]. In [19], Song and Yang construct
practical quantum one of two oblivious transfer and QBC protocols based on
[20] with physical security.
GP He finds a new way to construct QBC scheme [21, 22] based on
orthogonal quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme [23, 24]. In his QBC
scheme, Alice plays the role of the two parties in the orthogonal QKD scheme,
while Bob plays the eavesdropper in the QKD scheme. The orthogonal states
of GP He’s schemes are the key point to resist the attack presented by no-go
theorem. Inspired by his construction, we propose a QBC protocol based on
counterfactual quantum cryptography [25]. In our protocol, although Bob
plays the role of the eavesdropper in counterfactual QKD, both Alice and
Bob are senders and receivers. Even though our construction is inspired
by GP He’s scheme, the reason of our protocol evading no-go theorem is
different from his. The main reason is that Alice cannot distinguish which
qubits arrive at her site and which qubits she should apply the local unitary
transformation on, which probably gives a new way of constructing QBC
protocol.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is
the preliminaries of counterfactual QKD and its security. Section 3 gives a
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universal framework for QBC protocol. We propose our QBC protocol in
Section 4. Security analysis on probability and choosing the appropriate se-
curity parameters are in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively. In Section 7,
we discuss the reason that our protocol evades no-go theorem. The possi-
ble development and the main ideas of our protocol are summarized in the
discussion and conclusion sections.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Counterfactual quantum cryptography
[25] proposed a special QKD protocol (N09), in which the particle car-
rying secret information is not transmitted through the quantum channel.
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of the QKD protocol. In the QKD protocol,
Alice randomly encodes horizontal-polarized state |H〉 as the bit value ”0”
or vertical-polarized state |V 〉 as the bit value ”1” and sends the state by
the single photon source S. When Bob’s bit value is the same as Alice’s,
the optical switch SW controlled in the correct time. In this case, the in-
terference is destroyed and there are three occasions for the single photon.
Suppose the reflectivity and transmissivity of the BS are R and T , where
R + T = 1. (i) Detector D0 clicks with the probability of R
2. The photon
travels via path a and then is reflected by the BS again. (ii) Detector D1
clicks with the probability of RT . The photon travels via path a and then
pass though the BS. (iii) Detector D2 clicks with the probability of T . The
photon travels via path b and is controlled by the SW to reach the detector
D2. When Bob’s bit value is different from Alice’s, the setup is a Michelson-
type interferometer and the detector D0 clicks. Alice and Bob only remain
the bit in the event that the detector D1 clicks alone to be the shared keys.
The other events are used for eavesdropping detection.
2.2. The security of counterfactual quantum cryptography
The key point of the N09 protocol is that the final shared keys is made
up of the pulses only travel via the path a not the path b. Actually the
secret keys are not transmitted through the quantum channel. In [26], Yin
et al. proposed an entanglement distillation protocol equivalent to the N09
protocol. Then give a strict security proof assuming that the perfect single
photon source is applied and Trojan-horse attack can be detected. In 2012,
Zhang et al. give a more intuitive security proof against the general intercept-
resend attacks [27]. These show that the N09 protocol is secure in ideal
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Figure 1: The architecture of the N09 QKD protocol. The setup is a modification based on
Michelson-type interferometer. The single photon source S emits a optical pulse containing
only one photon. Then the pulse is transmitted through the optical circulator C and split
into two pulses by the beam splitter BS. The two light paths a and b are the arms of the
Michelson-type interferometer, and the length of the path a is adjusted by an optical delay
OD. The pulse transmitted through path a is reflected by the Faraday mirror FM0 and
back to BS. The pulse transmitted through path b travels to Bob’s site. If the pulse is
horizontally polarized, it pass through the polarizing beam splitter PBS, or it is reflected
by PBS and pass through the optical loop OL. The arriving time to the optical switch
SW of the different polarized pulses is different. Only the SW controlled in the correct
time, the pulse will reach the detector D2. Otherwise, the pulse will be reflected by FM1
and return back to Alice’s site. The back pulse from path b and the pulse from path a are
combined at the BS and interfered to lead the detector D0 to click.
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Figure 2: The eavesdropping strategy of N09 protocol. Based on the original architecture
of N09 protocol, Eve prepares the same apparatus as Alice’s and places them by the router
module. The router module contains the beam splitter BSE1 , the phase modulator PME ,
optical delay lines OD1 and Faraday mirror FM2.
conditions with infinite recourses. An attack for the protocol that the devices
used by Alice and Bob are perfect but the length of the generated key is finite
was presented in [28].
The eavesdropping strategy of [28] is shown in Fig. 2. The eavesdropping
scheme is outlined below. (i) When Alice sends a photon to Bob, Eve also
sends a random polarized photon at the same time. (ii) Eve records which
detectors click. (iii) After Alice and Bob publish their detection results, Eve
can extract secret information when both of the detectors D1 and DE1 click.
We first analyze the photon sent by Alice (S0). The photon is transmitted
through the optical circulator C0 and split by he beam splitter BS1 into two
wave packets. The wave packet through path a stays in Alice’s site while
the wave packet through path b passes through the beam splitter BSE0 and
evolves into two wave packets through paths c and d. The wave packet
through path c may travel back to Alice’s site or Eve’s site. The wave packet
through path d travels to Bob’s site. If Bob’s bit is different from Alice’s, the
wave packet through path d is reflected by the Faraday mirror FM1 and back
to the beam splitter BEE0 . The optical delay OD1 and the phase modulator
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PME are used to adjust the wave packet through path c to interfere with the
wave packet through path d. Then it travels to the beam splitter BS1 and
interfere with the wave packet through path a and makes the detector D0
click. If Bob’s bit is the same as Alice’s, the interference is destroyed. The
detectors D0, D1 and D2 are all possible to click. The condition of the photon
sent by Eve is similar to the analysis above. After Alice and Bob announce the
detection results, Eve knows that the polarization of the information qubit
is the same as his when detectors D1 and DE1 . The addition of another
detector leads to multiple photon detection and the detection probability
of D0, D1 and D2 may be changed. However, by analysis the probability
of all the detection, the error rate introduced by the attack tend to zero
simultaneously as rE0 → 0, where rE0 is the reflectivity of the beam splitter
BSE0 . To ensure the correlation between Bob and Eve, rE0 never reach the
value 0. Although this attack cannot work in the ideal N09 protocol with
infinite resources, the error rate can be due to the imperfect devices in the
practical with finite resources.
3. A framework for QBC
QBC is a two-party cryptographic protocol. In the commit phase, one
party Alice commits to the other party Bob to a bit b by sending a piece
of evidence. In the opening phase, Alice announces the value of b and Bob
verifies whether it is indeed the commit bit. We define a kind of quantum
channel to construct QBC protocol.
Definition 1. QBC Channel
In commit phase, Alice sends quantum states as a piece of evidence of commit
bit to Bob via a channel, for each qubit if
1. The probability of Bob knowing for sure what Alice sends is denoted
PB, 0 < PB < 1;
2. The probability that Alice confirms that Bob obtains her state is denoted
PA, 0 ≤ PA < PB.
Then, the channel is named a QBC channel.
PB > 0 means that Bob has a piece of evidence. Because of PB < 1, Bob
cannot know all of the qubits correctly. By choosing appropriate security
parameters n, the protocol can satisfy the concealing security. If Alice tries
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to alter one bit in the opening phase, her best choice is to change the bit
she cannot distinguish whether Bob knows with a probability of 1− PA. In
fact, there are around (1−PB)n qubits Bob cannot judge. If PA = PB, Alice
can accurately alters the bit in part that Bob really does not know without
detection. If PA < PB, the range of bits Alice alters 1−PA is larger than Bob
cannot distinguish, and her attack may be caught. Therefore, the conditions
0 ≤ PA < PB < 1 is the necessary condition of the binding security.
4. QBC based on N09
We use the N09 protocol to construct our QBC protocol. As the security
of the N09 protocol has been proved and the key point of the attack for
finite resources introduced is to control the reflectivity of the beam splitter
BSE0 (see Sect. 2.2). However, rE0 → 0 can only protect Eve from detection.
She cannot obtain all the information by the devices in Fig. 2 with finite
detectors.
-
The party Alice in the QBC protocol plays the role of the both parties in
the N09 protocol. And the behavior of the party Bob in the QBC protocol is
the same as that of Eve in the N09 protocol. The information Bob obtains
is treated as the piece of the evidence in the commit phase, which cannot
unveil the value of b for Bob and ensures Alice not to change it. Fig. 3 shows
the architecture of our QBC protocol.
Protocol 1. Counterfactual quantum bit commitment
Commit Phase:
1. Alice and Bob set up devices according to Fig. 3, where the beam split-
ters BSA, BSB0 and BSB1 are half transparent and half reflecting mir-
rors. The detection devices in the Fig. 3 are simplified graphics which
can detect the number and the polarization of the photons. They agree
on two security parameters m and n.
2. Alice chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} as her commit bit. Then she gen-
erates m random bit strings according to the value of b. Each sequence
consists n bits, which can be represented as a(i) ≡ (a(i)1 a(i)2 ...a(i)n ) ∈
{0, 1}n, i = 1, 2, ...,m. The sequences satisfy a(i)1 ⊕ a(i)2 ⊕ ...⊕ a(i)n = b.
3. Bob generates m bit strings randomly and uniformly with the length of
n. Each sequence is represented as b(i) ≡ (b(i)1 b(i)2 ...b(i)n ) ∈ {0, 1}n.
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Figure 3: The architecture of our QBC protocol. Alice’s apparatus are the same as the
sender and receiver of N09 protocol while Bob’s apparatus are the same as the eavesdrop-
ping of [28]. As the two parties of the QBC protocol, the distance between them is L. The
length of the optical delay line OD0 is around 2L and the lengths of the optical delay line
OD1 and OD2 are around L.
4. Alice and Bob decide on a series of time instants t
(i)
1 , t
(i)
2 , ..., t
(i)
n and
4t, where 4t is the time a photon spends from the beam splitter BSB1
to BSB0. Alice sends |Ψa(i)j 〉 at the time t
(i)
j while Bob sends |Ψb(i)j 〉
at the time t
(i)
j +4t by their own single photon sources, respectively.
|Ψ0〉 = |H〉 and |Ψ1〉 = |V 〉 represent the horizontal-polarized state and
the vertical-polarized state, respectively.
5. Alice and Bob record the time and response of their detectors.
Opening Phase:
1. Alice reveals the commit bit b, the m sequences (a
(i)
1 a
(i)
2 ...a
(i)
n ) and the
response of her three detectors to Bob.
2. Bob verifies whether a
(i)
1 ⊕ a(i)2 ⊕ ... ⊕ a(i)n = b, and the response of all
the detectors agree with the state |Ψ
a
(i)
j
〉. If the consistency holds, he
admits Alice’s commit value as b.
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5. Security analysis
5.1. Basic ideas
The response of the detectors is according to the consistency of the bits
chosen by Alice and Bob, which keeps secret in commit phase. By the re-
sponse of detectors DB0 and DB1 , Bob knows Alice’s bit for sure with a
probability of PB. Alice confirms that Bob knows her bit at the ratio of PA
according to the response of her detectors D0, D1 and D2. If Alice tries to
attack the binding of the protocol, she has to alter odd bits for each sequence
in the opening phase. In each sequence, she can distinguish that around PAn
bits are confirmed by Bob. Alice’s optimal strategy is to alter one bit in the
range of the other (1−PA)n bits. Among the (1−PA)n bits, only (1−PB)n
bits are not known by Bob. Therefore, the probability that Alice alters one
bit without detection is
P (Aalter) =
1− PB
1− PA . (1)
Then in the QBC scheme, the probability of changing the commit bit without
detection is P (Aatler)m. When P (Aalter) < 1, the probability of breaking
the binding security can be arbitrarily close to zero with the increase of m.
Given a binding security threshold α, i.e. P (Aatler)m < α, the range of m
is
m >
logα
logP (Aalter)
(2)
For a sequence of qubits, Bob makes sure the commit value with a prob-
ability of P nB. Given m qubit strings, the probability that Bob has no idea
about the commit value is (1 − P nB)m. Define ε as the probability that Bob
ascertains the commit value,
ε ≡ 1− (1− P nB)m . (3)
If Bob does not confirm the commit value from the protocol, he just guess
with a probability of 1/2. Therefore, the probability that Bob obtians the
right commit value is
P (Bknows) = ε+
1− ε
2
=
1
2
+
ε
2
. (4)
Then the advantage of Bob breaking the concealing security is∣∣∣∣P (Bknows)− 12
∣∣∣∣ = ε2 = 12 − (1− P nB)m2 (5)
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When P nB is small, Eq. (5) approximates to mP
n
B/2, which can be arbitrarily
close to zero with appropriate security parameters m and n. Given a con-
cealing security threshold β, to satisfy
∣∣P (Bknows)− 1
2
∣∣ < β the accurate
range of n is
n >
log[1− (1− 2β)1/m]
logPB
. (6)
Based on the analysis above, if the quantum channel is a QBC channel
in Definition 1, which satisfies 0 ≤ PA < PB < 1, we can choose appropriate
security parameters to make the protocol secure. Then we analyze the re-
sponse of each detector and the relations between the response and PA, PB,
calculate the values of PA, PB and give the appropriate security parameters.
5.2. The response of each detector
In our protocol, the detector D2 is in Alice’site and Alice controls the
optical switch SW according to the states sent by herself. Therefore, the
photon sent by Alice cannot interfere. All the situations can be classified
into two categories, one is a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j , the other is a(i)j = b(i)j .
1. When the bits chosen by Alice and Bob are different, i.e. a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j , the
photon sent by Bob’s source SB must interfere and return to detector
DB0 . There are different optical paths to make the detectors click.
(a) Detector D0 clicks. There are two possible situations. One is
that the photon sent by the source SA is reflected by the beam
splitter BSA, travels through the path c, then returns back to the
beam splitter BSA and detector D0 responses, i.e. SA → C0 →
BSA → FM0 → BSA → C0 → D0. For the other path, the
photon sent by the source SA travel through the beam splitter
BSA and is reflected by the beam splitter BSB0 , then reflected by
the Faraday mirror FM2 back to the path d and arrive to detector
D0, i.e. SA → C0 → BSA → BSB0 → FM2 → BSB0 → BSA →
C0 → D0.
(b) Detector D1 clicks. The two paths are similar to those lead D0
click. The difference is that when the photon sent by the source
SA returns to the beam splitter BSA, it goes via the other path
to detector D1 instead to D0, i.e. SA → C0 → BSA → FM0 →
BSA → D1 and SA → C0 → BSA → BSB0 → FM2 → BSB0 →
BSA → D1.
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(c) Detector D2 clicks. There is only one possible path for this de-
tection. The photon sent by the source SA travels through the
beam splitter BSA and BSB0 via the path j reach detector D2,
i.e. SA → C0 → BSA → BSB0 → PBS → D2.
(d) Detector DB0 clicks. There are two possible situations. The pho-
ton sent by Bob is detected at detector DB0 , i.e. SB → C1 →
BSB1 → interference → C1 → DB0 . The photon sent by Alice
could go to detector DB0 via the paths a, d, i, h and through the
beam splitter BSB1 , i.e. SA → C0 → BSA → BSB0 → FM2 →
BSB0 → BSB1 → C1 → DB0 .
(e) Detector DB1 clicks. There is the only path for this situation
that the photon sent by Alice travels via the paths a, d, i, h
and is reflected by the beam splitter BSB1 to detector DB1 , i.e.
SA → C0 → BSA → BSB0 → FM2 → BSB0 → BSB1 → DB1 .
2. When the bits chosen by Alice and Bob are the same, i.e. a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j ,
there is no interference. The paths which make the detectors click are
as follows.
(a) Detector D0 clicks. There are three different paths to make detec-
tor D0 click. Two of them are the same as the situation a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j .
And the third path is that the photon sent by the source SB travels
through the paths e, h, i, d, then goes through the beam splitter
BSA and arrives at detector D0. They are SA → C0 → BSA →
FM0 → BSA → C0 → D0, SA → C0 → BSA → BSB0 → FM2 →
BSB0 → BSA → C0 → D0, and SB → C1 → BSB1 → BSB0 →
FM2 → BSB0 → BSA → C0 → D0.
(b) Detector D1 clicks. The three paths are the similar to those of
detector D0. When the photon travels back to the beam splitter
BSA, it goes the way to detector D1. They are SA → C0 →
BSA → FM0 → BSA → D1, SA → C0 → BSA → BSB0 →
FM2 → BSB0 → BSA → D1, and SB → C1 → BSB1 → BSB0 →
FM2 → BSB0 → BSA → D1.
(c) Detector D2 clicks. Two different paths make the detector re-
sponse. One is the same as the situation a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j . The other one
is that the photon sent by Bob travels via the paths e, h, j and get
to the detector, i.e. SB → C1 → BSB1 → BSB0 → PBS → D2.
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(d) Detector DB0 clicks. There are three possible situations. One is
that the photon sent by the source SA travels via the paths a, d,
i, h, e to the detector, i.e. SA → C0 → BSA → BSB0 → FM2 →
BSB0 → BSB1 → C1 → DB0 . The second one is that the photon
sent by Bob travels via the paths e, h, i, h to the beam splitter
BSB1 , then leads the detector click, i.e. SB → C1 → BSB1 →
BSB0 → FM2 → BSB0 → BSB1 → C1 → DB0 . The last one is
that the photon sent by Bob is reflected by the beam splitter BSB1
and the Faraday mirror FM3, then through the optical circulator
C1 to the detector, i.e. SB → C1 → BSB1 → FM3 → BSB1 →
C1 → DB0 .
(e) Detector DB1 clicks. The paths are similar to those in the last
item. The difference is that when the photon return to the beam
splitter BSB1 , it goes directly to detector DB1 , i.e. SA → C0 →
BSA → BSB0 → FM2 → BSB0 → BSB1 → DB1 , SB → C1 →
BSB1 → BSB0 → FM2 → BSB0 → BSB1 → DB1 , and SB →
C1 → BSB1 → FM3 → BSB1 → DB1 .
According the analysis of the optical paths, we obtain the detection prob-
abilities of the detectors, which are listed in Table 1 and 2. It can be seen
that some detectors may receive two photons. In the analysis of the ability
to attack, assume each detection equipment has the ability to measure the
polarization and the number of the photons.
Table 1: The detection probability of each detector for the photon sent by Alice. PD0 ,
PD1 , PD2 , PDB0 , and PDB1 are he detection probabilities of detectors D0, D1, D2, DB0 and
DB1 , respectively. rA and tA are the reflectivity and transmissivity of the beam splitter
BSA. rB0 and tB0 are the reflectivity and transmissivity of the beam splitter BSB0 . rB1
and tB1 are the reflectivity and transmissivity of the beam splitter BSB1 .
a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j a(i)j = b(i)j
PD0 r
2
A + t
2
Ar
2
B0
r2A + t
2
Ar
2
B0
PD1 rAtA + tAr
2
B0
rA rAtA + tAr
2
B0
rA
PD2 tAtB0 tAtB0
PDB0 tArB0tB0tB1 tArB0tB0tB1
PDB1 tArB0tB0rB1 tArB0tB0rB1
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Table 2: The detection probability of each detector for the photon sent by Bob.
a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j a(i)j = b(i)j
PD0 0 tB1tB0rB0tA
PD1 0 tB1tB0rB0rA
PD2 0 tB1rB0
PDB0 1 t
2
B1
t2B0 + r
2
B1
PDB1 0 tB1t
2
B0
rB1 + rB1tB1
5.3. Probabilities related to the security (PA and PB)
By analyzing the response of detectors, Bob knows Alice’s bit for sure
with probability PB. And the probability of Alice determining whether Bob
knows he bit is PA. In our protocol, Alice and Bob send a photon by their
own single photon source. Therefore, each party at most detects two photons
in the protocol. By classifying different number of the photons detected by
Alice and Bob, analyze the probabilities PB and PA. There are only three
situations. (i) Both of the two photons go to Alice’s site, while Bob detects
none. (ii) One photon goes to Alice’s site, while the other goes to Bob’s. (iii)
Both of the two photons go to Bob’s site, while Alice detects none.
1. Alice detects two photons. Two photons both get to Alice’ site means
that Bob detects no photon. If their bits are a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j , the photon sent
by Bob must interfere and return to detector DB0 . Therefore, when
Alice detects two photons and Bob detects none, they know a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j .
Below are the cases that Alice detects two photons.
(a) Only one of Alice’s detectors clicks. When detector D0 detects
two photon, the probability is the probability that D0 detects the
photon sent by Alice times the probability that D0 detects the
photon sent by Bob in the case of a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j . According to Table 1
and 2,
P (two photons in D0) =
1
2
(
r2A + t
2
Ar
2
B0
)
tB1tB0rB0tA, (7)
where 1/2 is the probability of the case a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j . Similarly, the
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probabilities of two photons detection of D1 and D2 are
P (two photons in D1) =
1
2
(
rAtA + tAr
2
B0
rA
)
tB1tB0rB0rA, (8)
P (two photons in D2) =
1
2
tAtB0tB1rB0 . (9)
(b) Two of Alice’s detectors click. When a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j , both detectors
D0 and D1 may click. The photon sent by Alice and the photon
sent by Bob are received by the detectors. And the detection
probability of both D0 and D1 is
P (D0, D1) =
1
2
[ (
r2A + t
2
Ar
2
B0
)
tB1tB0rB0rA
+
(
rAtA + tAr
2
B0
rA
)
tB1tB0rB0tA
]
.
(10)
The detection probabilities of both D0 and D2, D1 and D2 are
P (D0, D2) =
1
2
[(
r2A + t
2
Ar
2
B0
)
tB1rB0 + tB1t
2
B0
rB0t
2
A
]
, (11)
P (D1, D2) =
1
2
[(
rAtA + tAr
2
B0
rA
)
tB1rB0 + tB1t
2
B0
rB0rAtA
]
.
(12)
2. Each party detects one photon. One photon goes to Alice’s site while
the other goes to Bob’s. As Bob has only two detectors, either detector
DB0 or detector DB1 receives a photon.
(a) Detector DB0 clicks. When the bits chosen by them satisfy a
(i)
j 6=
b
(i)
j , the photon sent by Bob will be interfere and make the detector
response. When a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j , there is a possibility that photon sent
by Alice or Bob goes to the detector. Whatever a
(i)
j and b
(i)
j are,
detector DB0 may click. The polarization of the receiving photon
is in accordance with the choice of Bob’s bit, which makes Bob
cannot distinguish what Alice sends.
(b) Detector DB1 clicks. In this case, detector DB0 receives no photon,
which denotes a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j and Bob knows what a
(i)
j is. One of the
photon goes to DB1 while the other one goes to Alice’s site. The
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probability of this case is that
P (DB1 , Alice) (13)
=
1
2
[(
r2A + t
2
Ar
2
B0
+ rAtA + tAr
2
B0
rA + tAtB0
)(
tB1t
2
B0
rB1 + rB1tB1
)
+
(
tB1tB0rB0tA + tB1tB0rB0rA + tB1rB0
)
tArB0tB0rB1
]
3. Both of Bob’s detectors click. For the two detectors, there are three
cases as follows.
(a) Detector DB0 receives two photons. Whatever a
(i)
j and b
(i)
j are,
the two photon have possibility to get to DB0 . When Alice’s and
Bob’s bits satisfy a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j , the polarizations of the two photon
are different. Otherwise, the polarizations are the same. Bob
could know Alice’s bit by the polarizations. The probability of
confirming Alice’s bit in this case is
P (two photons in DB0) =
1
2
tArB0tB0tB1+
1
2
tArB0tB0tB1
(
t2B1t
2
B0
+ r2B1
)
(14)
(b) Detector DB1 receives two photons. a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j leads at least one
photon go to detector DB0 . Therefore, Bob knows that a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j ,
when DB1 receives two photons. The probability of two photons
in DB1 is
P (two photons in DB1) =
1
2
tArB0tB0rB1
(
tB1t
2
B0
rB1 + rB1tB1
)
(15)
(c) Both detectors DB0 and DB1 receive one photon. Bob confirms
Alice’s bit by the polarizations of the different photons. With the
different choices of a
(i)
j and b
(i)
j , the probabilities are
P (DB0 , DB1) =
1
2
tArB0tB0rB1 +
1
2
[
tArB0tB0tB1
(
tB1t
2
B0
rB1
+ rB1tB1
)
+
(
t2B1t
2
B0
+ r2B1
)
tArB0tB0rB1
] (16)
Through the analysis above, it can be seen that when both photons re-
ceived by one of the party, Alice knows that Bob confirms the value of her
bit. The probability PA is the sum of Eq. (7) to Eq. (16) except Eq. (13).
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For each beam splitter, the sum of the reflectivity and the transmissivity is
1, i.e. rA + tA = 1, rB0 + tB0 = 1 and rB1 + tB1 = 1. The reduction result of
the probability PA is
PA =
1
2
[
tAtB0 + 2tAtB0tB1 − 5tAtB0t2B1 + 2tAtB0t3B1 − tAt2B0 − 2tAt2B0tB1
+ 5tAt
2
B0
t2B1 − 2tAt2B0t3B1 + 3tAt3B0tB1 − 3tAt3B0t2B1 + 2tAt3B0t3B1
− 3tAt4B0tB1 + 3tAt4B0t2B1 − 2tAt4B0t3B1 − t2B0tB1 + tB1
]
.
(17)
The probability PB is the sum of Eq. (7) to Eq. (16). And the reduction
result is
PB =
1
2
[
tAtB0 + 2tAtB0tB1 − 5tAtB0t2B1 + 2tAtB0t3B1 − tAt2B0 − 2tAt2B0tB1
+ 5tAt
2
B0
t2B1 − 2tAt2B0t3B1 + tAt3B0tB1 − tAt3B0t2B1 + 2tAt3B0t3B1
− tAt4B0tB1 + tAt4B0t2B1 − 2tAt4B0t3B1 − t2B0t2B1 + 2tB1 − t2B1
]
(18)
6. Appropriate security parameters
6.1. Security against malicious choice of optimal beam splitters
It can be seen that the probabilities PA and PB are determined by the
parameters of three beam splitters. According to Fig. 3, the beam splitter
BSA is in Alice’s own site, BSB0 and BSB1 both belong to Bob. That is, a
malicious party may not use the half transparent and half reflecting mirror.
Instead, he (she) uses the devices in favor of his (her) attack.
We first consider the situation where both parties are honest. In this
situation, all of the beam splitters are half transparent and half reflecting
mirrors, i.e. tA = tB0 = tB1 = 1/2. According to Eq. (17) and (17), the
probabilities are
PA =
17
64
, PB =
53
128
. (19)
The probability that Alice alters one bit of a sequence without detection is
P (Aalter) =
1− PB
1− PA =
75
94
. (20)
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To satisfy the security threshold α and β, according to Eq. (2) and (6) the
range of m and n are
m >
logα
logP (Aalter)
=
logα
log(75/94)
, (21)
n >
log[1− (1− 2β)1/m]
logPB
=
log[1− (1− 2β)1/m]
log(53/128)
, (22)
respectively.
However, Alice and Bob may try to attack the protocol. The binding se-
curity is determined by the probability P (Aalter) and the security parameter
m. The concealing security is determined by the probability PB and the two
security parameters m and n. The larger the security parameters are, the
more secure the protocol is. We first analyze Alice’s optimal strategy of the
maximum P ′(Aalter). Then analyze Bob’s optimal strategy of the maximum
P ′′B. To protect both binding and concealing security, there are appropriate
value ranges of m and n.
A malicious Alice attacks the binding of QBC protocol, who can optimize
the BSA to make a larger P
′(Aalter). In this case, Bob sets up his beam
splitters as half transparent and half reflecting mirrors, tB0 = tB1 = 1/2. The
probabilities P ′A and P
′
B are
P ′A =
5
32
tA +
3
16
, P ′B =
9
64
tA +
11
32
. (23)
The probability that Alice alters one bit of a sequence without detection is
P ′(Aalter) =
1− PB
1− PA =
42− 9tA
52− 10tA . (24)
Alice can set up the beam splitter BSA as tA = 0 to get the maximum
P ′(Alater). When tA = 0, P ′(Aalter) = 2126 , P
′
B =
11
32
. Even if Alice changes
the beam splitter, the binding security can still be achieved by choosing
appropriate secure parameters. To satisfy the security threshold α and β, m
and n should satisfy
m >
logα
logP ′(Aalter)
=
logα
log(21/26)
, (25)
n >
log[1− (1− 2β)1/m′ ]
logP ′B
=
log[1− (1− 2β)1/m′ ]
log(11/32)
, (26)
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respectively. It can be seen that the threshold of Eq. (25) is lager than that
of Eq. (21) considered Alice’s attack. To ensure the binding security of the
protocol, the range of m in Eq. (25) is appropriate.
A malicious Bob attacks the concealing of QBC protocol, who can op-
timize the beam splitters BSB0 and BSB1 to obtain a larger P
′′
B. In this
case, Alice’s beam splitter is a half transparent and half reflecting mirror,
tA = 1/2. For each qubit, the probability that Bob knows for sure what
Alice sends is
P ′′B =
1
2
(
tB0/2 + tB0tB1 − 5tB0t2B1/2 + tB0t3B1 − t2B0/2− t2B0tB1 + 3t2B0t2B1/2
− t2B0t3B1 + t3B0tB1/2− t3B0t2B1/2 + t3B0t3B1 − t4B0tB1/2 + t4B0t2B1/2
− t4B0t3B1 + 2tB1 − t2B1
)
(27)
Figure 4: When tA = 1/2, the probability P
′′
B that Bob knows for sure what Alice sends
varies with different transmissivities of the beam splitters BSB0 and BSB1 .
Fig. 4 shows the probability of P ′′B. When tB0 = 0, tB1 = 1, the maximum
of P ′′B is 1/2. To protect the QBC protocol from Alice’s attack, Bob agrees
the security parameter m according to Eq. (25). Given a security threshold
β, n should satisfy
n >
log[1− (1− 2β)1/m]
logP ′′B
= − log[1− (1− 2β)1/m]. (28)
It can be seen that the threshold of Eq. (28) is lager than that of of Eq. (22),
which is considered Bob’s attack. To ensure the concealing security of the
protocol, the range of n in Eq. (28) is secure. Therefore, the range of appro-
priate security parameters should satisfy Eq. (25) and Eq. (28).
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When set up the specific security threshold, for example α = 10−6 and
β = 10−6, the security parameter m can be computed as m > 64.7 according
to Eq. (25). Assumed m = 65, the range of security parameter n is n > 24.9,
which can be set up as n = 25. Therefore, when m = 65, n = 25, no
matter what kind of beam splitter chosen by a malicious party the binding
and concealing satisfy the presupposed security requirement.
6.2. Security against malicious party sending advantageous states
To strictly execute the protocol, Alice and Bob should send single-photon
state. A malicious party may try to send no photon or multi-photon states
while the other party is honest to maintain the protocol. The case that one
of the parties sends multi-photon states leads the detectors to detect multi-
photon states. As long as the other party’s detectors response, she (he)
discovers the attack. For one of the parties sends no photon, the analysis is
as follows:
If Bob sends no photon, it means that Bob does not choose his bit b
(i)
j .
Only the photon sent by Alice is transmitted in the optical system. The
detection probability of each detector when Bob sends no photon is listed in
Table 3. Bob can measure the polarization of Alice’s photon by his detector.
The probability that Bob confirms Alice’s bit is PB(Bob none),
PB(Bob none) = PDB0 (Bnone) + PDB1 (Bnone) = tArB0tB0 ≤ tA. (29)
Considered there is only one malicious party, Alice strictly executes the pro-
tocol, i.e. tA = 1/2. In this case, PB(Bnone) ≤ P ′′B, the security parameters
determined in Subsection 6.1 are still appropriate.
Table 3: The detection probability of each detector when Bob sends no photon.
Bob sends no photon
PD0(Bnone) r
2
A + t
2
Ar
2
B0
PD1(Bnone) rAtA + tAr
2
B0
rA
PD2(Bnone) tAtB0
PDB0 (Bnone) tArB0tB0tB1
PDB1 (Bnone) tArB0tB0rB1
When Alice sends no photon, Bob strictly executes the protocol, i.e. tB0 =
tB1 = 1/2. Alice still chooses her bit a
(i)
j because of the existence of detector
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Table 4: The detection probabilities of each detector when Alice sends no photon.
a
(i)
j 6= b(i)j a(i)j = b(i)j
PD0(Anone) 0 tB1tB0rB0tA
PD1(Anone) 0 tB1tB0rB0rA
PD2(Anone) 0 tB1rB0
PDB0 (Anone) 1 t
2
B1
t2B0 + r
2
B1
PDB1 (Anone) 0 tBt
2
B0
rB1 + rBtB1
D2. The detection probabilities of each detector when Alice sends no photon
are listed in Tabel 4. Bob treats the cases that he detects two photons, DB1
clicks, and detects no photon as a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j . When Alice sends no photon, Bob
can never detect two photons. And the probability he confirms a
(i)
j = b
(i)
j is
PB(Anone),
PB(Anone) =
1
2
(
PD0(Anone) + PD1(Anone) + PD2(Anone) + PDB1 (Anone)
)
= 11/32.
(30)
In this case, only when Alice’s detectors respond, she ensures Bob knows her
bit, the probability of which is
PB(Anone) =
1
2
(
PD0(Anone) + PD1(Anone) + PD2(Anone)
)
= 3/16. (31)
Therefore, the probability Alice alters one bit in a sequence without detection
is
P (Aalter Anone) =
1− PB(Anone)
1− PA(Anone) = 21/26 = P
′(Aalter). (32)
The security parameters determined in Subsection 6.1 can still keep it secure.
7. The relation between our QBC and no-go theorem
The framework of no-go theorem is described as follows.
1. When Alice commits b, she prepares
|Φb〉 =
∑
i
α
(b)
i
∣∣e(b)i 〉A ⊗ ∣∣φ(b)i 〉B, (33)
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where
〈
e
(b)
i
∣∣e(b)j 〉A = δij while ∣∣φ(b)i 〉B’s are not necessarily orthogonal to
each other. She sends the second register to Bob as a piece of evidence.
2. To ensure the concealing of the QBC protocol, the density matrices
describing the second register are approximative. i.e.,
TrA|0〉〈0| ≡ ρB0 ' ρB1 ≡ TrA|1〉〈1|. (34)
3. When Eq. (34) is satisfied, Alice can apply a local unitary transforma-
tion UA to rotate |0〉 to |1〉 without detection.
We will demonstrate that our protocol is not fit the framework of no-
go theorem for three situations. (i) Alice sends the states according to the
protocol; (ii) Alice prepares 2n-qubits entangled states and sends part of
them; (iii) Alice prepares n-qubits entangled states and sends all of them.
7.1. The case that Alice sends the states honestly
In the commit phase of our protocol, Alice and Bob send m qubit strings
with the length of n, respectively. It is equivalent to the case that execute
the n qubits protocol m times. In the following analysis, we only consider
one qubit string with the length of n firstly. The ith sequence sent by Alice
contains n qubits
∣∣ΨA〉 ≡ ∣∣Ψa1〉⊗ ∣∣Ψa2〉⊗ ...⊗ ∣∣Ψan〉, while the sequence sent
by Bob is
∣∣ΨB〉 ≡ ∣∣Ψb1〉⊗ ∣∣Ψb2〉⊗ ...⊗ ∣∣Ψbn〉. The initial state of the system
is
∣∣ΨA〉 ⊗ ∣∣ΨB〉, which contains 2n qubits. After the commit phase of the
protocol, some of the 2n qubits are detected by Alice, others are detected by
Bob. The final state in Alice’s hands is∣∣Ψ′A〉 ≡ ∣∣Ψaµ1〉⊗ ∣∣Ψaµ2〉⊗ ...⊗ ∣∣Ψaµl〉∣∣Ψbν1〉⊗ ∣∣Ψbν2〉⊗ ...⊗ ∣∣Ψbνk〉, (35)
where µ1, µ2, ..., µl is the label of qubits sent by Alice and detected by Alice,
ν1, ν2, ..., νk is the label of qubits sent by Bob and detected by Alice. The
final state in Bob’s hands is∣∣Ψ′B〉 ≡ ∣∣Ψaµl+1〉⊗∣∣Ψaµl+2〉⊗...⊗∣∣Ψaµn〉∣∣Ψbνk+1〉⊗∣∣Ψbνk+2〉⊗...⊗∣∣Ψbνn〉, (36)
where µl+1, µl+2, ..., µn is the label of qubits sent by Alice and detected by
Bob, νk+1, νk+2, ..., νn is the label of qubits sent by Bob and detected by Bob.
In our protocol, the qubits in Alice’s hand and the qubits in Bob’s hand
are independent and different, which is different from Eq. (33). No matter
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what operation Alice applies on the registes in her’s hand, it cannot change
the states in Bob’s hand. To attack the binding security without detection,
the only way is to change the qubit in her own site. However, Bob may
knows Alice’s bit even if he does not detect the photons, which is classical
security analyzed in Section 5. Our QBC protocol does not fit the framework
of no-go theorem.
7.2. The case that Alice prepares the entangled states and sends part of them
If Alice prepares the entangled state as Eq. (33), i.e.
|Φb〉A =
∑
⊕
j aj=b
α
(b)
a(i)
∣∣e(b)
a(i)
〉
A
⊗ ∣∣Ψ(b)
a(i)
〉
patha
, (37)
where
∣∣e(b)
a(i)
〉
A
is an orthogonal basis of system A. She keeps the register A
and sends the second register through the path a in fig. 3. Bob sends the
single-photon states honestly as |Ψb1〉 ⊗ |Ψb2〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψbn〉. The initial state
of the whole system is
|Φb〉AB =
∑
⊕
j aj=b
α
(b)
a(i)
∣∣e(b)
a(i)
〉
A
⊗ ∣∣Ψ(b)
a(i)
〉
patha
⊗ |Ψb1Ψb2 ...Ψbj ...Ψbn〉B (38)
Bob’s detection leads the state to collapse to the other state. The qubits
which reach to detectors DB0 and DB1 are probably sent by Alice or Bob. If
Alice measures the qubits which goes to her detectors, all of the 2n qubits are
detected and the entanglement between the system A and the other registers
will be completely destroyed, which is not satisfied the condition of no-go
theorem. Therefore, she does not measure the qubits which goes to her
detectors in the beginning. According to the no-go theorem, if the density
matrices ρB0 ' ρB1 , Alice can apply a local unitary transformation to alter
the commit.
There are two possible strategies for Alice to apply no-go theorem type
attack. One is to treat the unsent register A as the register that she would
apply the local unitary transformation on. The difference between the states
of |Φ0〉AB and |Φ1〉AB is that at least one qubit |Ψaj〉 are different. Because
the states |Ψ0〉 = |H〉 and |Ψ1〉 = |V 〉 are orthogonal, the states |Φ0〉AB and
|Φ1〉AB are orthogonal. Therefore, the density matrices satisfies ρaB0 ⊥ ρaB1 ,
which leads to the inability of the no-go theorem. The other strategy is to
apply the local unitary transformation on the register A and the qubits which
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are sent by Alice and finally come back to Alice. If the qubits sent by Alice
and detected by Bob are the same when b = 0 and b = 1, the density matrices
describing the registers in Bob’s hand are the same, i.e. ρB0 = ρ
aB
1 , which
makes it possible for no-go theorem type attack. However, for keeping the
entanglement, Alice cannot measure the qubits in her hand before the attack.
It leads that she has no idea about the exactly states she would apply the
local unitary transformation. Therefore, she cannot apply the no-go theorem
type attack in this way.
7.3. The case that Alice prepares the entangled states and sends all of them
Alice may try to send another entangled state containing n qubits. The
aim of the operation is to make the qubits sent by Alice finally in Alice’s
hands are entangled with those in Bob’s hands. Assume that the state sent
by Alice is
1√
2n
∑
⊕
j aj=b
|Ψa1Ψa2 ...Ψaj ...Ψan〉. (39)
The initial state of the whole system is
1√
2n
∑
⊕
j aj=b
|Ψa1Ψa2 ...Ψaj ...Ψan〉 ⊗ |Ψb1Ψb2 ...Ψbj ...Ψbn〉. (40)
After executing the protocol, some of the qubits go to Alice’s site and the
others go to Bob’s. Bob measures the qubits honestly while Alice does not
measure temporarily. After Bob’s measurement, the state becomes
|Ψaµl+1 〉 ⊗ |Ψaµl+2 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψaµn 〉|Ψbνk+1 〉 ⊗ |Ψbνk+2 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψbνn 〉
⊗
∑
aµj ,bνj
|Ψaµ1 〉 ⊗ |Ψaµ2 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψaµl 〉|Ψbν1 〉 ⊗ |Ψbν2 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψbνk 〉, (41)
where µ1, µ2, ..., µl is the label of qubits sent by Alice and go to Alice,
ν1, ν2, ..., νk is the label of qubits sent by Bob and go to Alice. µl+1, µl+2, ..., µn
is the label of qubits sent by Alice and detected by Bob, νk+1, νk+2, ..., νn is
the label of qubits sent by Bob and detected by Bob. According to no-go
theorem, Alice can alter her commit bit by the local unitary transformation.
The precondition of no-go theorem is that Alice knows what the entangled
state is. In
∑
aµj ,bνj
|Ψaµ1 〉 ⊗ |Ψaµ2 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψaµl 〉|Ψbν1 〉 ⊗ |Ψbν2 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |Ψbνk 〉
of Eq. (41), Alice has no idea about the qubits sent by Bob. Therefore, she
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cannot find the local unitary transformation to attack. Even she found the
unitary transformation and altered the commit bit, she cannot reveal the
correct states sent by Bob and detected by Bob, which makes the attack
fails.
8. Discussion
The protocol we present in this paper is an ideal scheme without con-
sidering the error and loss in practice. Once there were error and loss in
the quantum channel, the detection would be different and influenced the
security of the scheme. Moreover, how to hold the stability of the Michelson-
type interferometer for long distance is the question. It’s worth considering
to improve our scheme by Sagnac interferometer. In Section 3, we propose
a framework for QBC without considering no-go theorem. How to construct
universal QBC framework which can resist no-go theorem type attack like
the scheme we proposed in this paper is worth to discuss. We would like to
leave these questions open for future researches.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new QBC protocol based on counterfactual
quantum cryptography. We analyze the security of this protocol, find that
it can resist the attack presented by QBC’s no-go theorem. There are two
essential reasons. (i) The states for different commit bit are orthogonal.
(ii) Alice cannot distinguish the qubits that reach to her detectors sent by
whom. Then she does not know which registers she could apply the unitary
transformation UA of no-go theorem, which probably gives a new way of
constructing QBC protocols.
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